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JUSTICE SCALIA AND TONTO
FISTFIGHT IN HEAVEN
Ray Martin*
INTRODUCTION
In the last generation, the Supreme Court has changed the way
that it interprets statutes that regulate Indian affairs.1 The Court has
moved away from using legislative history and the Indian law
canons of construction to aid in its interpretation of Indian law
statutes, to relying on textualism and plain meaning. Throughout
the twentieth century, the Court used the Indian law canons of
construction found in Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co. v. United
States2 and legislative history to analyze Indian law statutes. The
Court used these tools of statutory interpretation to reach decisions
in Indian law cases concerning a variety of issues ranging from
tribal sovereignty, hunting and fishing rights, to tribal freedom
from taxation by the state and local governments. The Court’s use
of the Indian law canons of construction along with legislative
history allowed it to craft opinions that were in harmony with the
trust relationship that exists between the United States and Indian
tribes.
In cases that involve interpreting statutes that regulate Indian
affairs, the Court has now opted to ignore the Indian law canons of
construction and legislative history. Instead the Court halts its
statutory interpretation in Indian law cases at the plain text
*

The author is a rising third year law student at Columbia Law School, and a
citizen of the Tolowa Deeni Nation of California.
1
The title of this note reflects the ongoing battle in Indian law between
textualism and the Indian canons of construction and legislative history that
occurs when the Supreme Court must engage in statutory interpretation in an
Indian law case. The title of the note also owes an assist to the incomparable
Sherman Alexie, and his book The Lone Ranger and Tonto Fistfight in Heaven.
The author would like to thank Professor and note adviser Steven P. McSloy for
his help and patience. A huge thank you to the following people who helped
with this note: the staff at the American Indian Law Journal, Kelsey Leonard,
Joseph Webster, Lael Echo-Hawk, Judy Gallardo, Curtis Berkey, Dan
Lewerenz, and David Moran. Last, but not least, a huge thank you to Charlie
Hobbs for tirelessly advocating for Indian tribes and inspiring so many people,
the author included, to pursue the study of Indian law.
2
Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 86 (1918).
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contained in the statutes. This use of textualism ignores the vital
purpose that the Indian law canons of construction and legislative
history play in statutory interpretation in Indian law; that of
providing context and full meaning to the words in the statute, and
the intent(s) of Congress in passing the legislation, while also
paying respect to the sacred trust relationship that exists between
the United States and tribes.
This note begins by concentrating on the trust relationship
between the United States and Indian tribes. In part one the note
will focus on how the Indian law canons of construction were born
out of the trust relationship and the relationship between Congress
and the plenary power that it holds over Indian tribes. The unique
relationship and power dynamic between Congress and Indian
tribes will demonstrate the importance of using the Indian law
canons of construction and legislative history when interpreting
Indian law statutes.
Part two will examine three Indian law cases decided before
1986, when Justice Antonin Scalia replaced Justice William
Rehnquist who was elevated to Chief Justice upon the death of
Chief Justice Warren Burger. These three cases used the Indian
law canons of construction and legislative history to reach a
positive outcome for tribal interests in cases that involved
questions of statutory interpretation and an opinion that is in
harmony with the trust relationship between the United States and
the Blackfeet Tribe. It is the framework used by the Court to reach
its decision in Montana v. Blackfeet, as well as the two other cases,
that should be readopted by the Court in interpreting statutes in
Indian law cases.
Part three explores how the use of textualism has allowed the
Court to render decisions in cases involving statutory interpretation
in Indian law that have largely ignored the trust relationship, the
intent of Congress in passing the statute, and the Indian law canons
of construction.
Part four examines several Indian law cases from the Rehnquist
and Roberts Courts. These latter cases cover a number of areas of
Indian law, yet they share a common theme: the Court avoided
using the Indian law canons of construction and legislative history
in statutory interpretation. Instead, in these cases, the Court opted
to engage in a selective analysis that places a paramount
importance on textualism to divine the meaning of the statute. In
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each of these cases, the Court uses textualism to interpret a statute
in a manner that results in the Court rendering a decision that has a
negative impact for a tribe or a tribal individual. Further, in each of
these cases the Court’s use of textualism results in a decision that
is not in harmony with the trust relationship. By using legislative
history and the Indian law canons of construction to interpret these
cases, the Court could have interpreted the statute at issue in each
case so it that there is no conflict with the trust relationship
between the United States and Indian tribes.
I.

THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP

The Court has long recognized that a trust relationship exists
between the United States and Indian tribes.3 The trust relationship
is frequently acknowledged and reaffirmed by Congress as:
“Nearly every piece of modern legislation dealing with Indian
tribes contains a statement reaffirming the trust relationship
between tribes and the United States.”4 The trust relationship was
created through the treaties that the United States entered into with
Indian tribes during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.5
From the birth of the Republic until 1871, when Congress
passed the Indian Appropriations Act of 18716, which prohibited
future treaty making between Indian nations and the United States,
the United States entered into hundreds of treaties with various
tribal nations.7 During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
Congress and the President sent emissaries to the various tribes
that the United States encountered during its westward expansion.8
3

United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 493 (2003).
FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 420-421 (Neil
J. Newton et al., eds., 2012 ed., 2012).
5
See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 33 (1942) (“The
chief foundation [of federal power over Indian affairs] appears to have been the
treaty-making power of the President and Senate with its corollary of
Congressional power to implement by legislation the treaties made. And by a
broad reading of these treaties the national government obtained from the
Indians themselves authority to legislate from them to carry out the purpose of
the treaties.”).
6
See Indian Appropriation Act of Mar. 3, 1871, Ch. 120, §1, 41 Cong.; 16 Stat.
544 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §71) (“no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of
the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation,
tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”).
7
COHEN, supra note 6, at 46-66.
8
COHEN, supra note 6, at 51.
4
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These emissaries entered into treaties with tribes that were then
ratified by the United States Senate.9 In these treaties, the Indian
tribes ceded land to the United States and, in exchange, the United
States made promises to Indian tribes to protect them, provide
them with certain services, and respect the territorial integrity of
their newly formed reservations in perpetuity.10 These treaties
created a moral obligation between the United States government
and Indian tribes. In many treaties the United States promised to
look after the tribe, protect them, and manage the affairs of the
tribe.11The Court in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia analogized the
trust relationship to that that exists between a ward and their
guardian.12 The trust relationship be thought of as an affirmation
that the United States holds a moral obligation to Indian tribes to
protect their interests.13Out of the trust relationship that was
established by the signing of treaties between Indian nations and
the United States the Court would create the Indian law canons of
construction.
A.

The Origins of the Indian Law Canons of Construction

The Indian law canons of construction are two closely related
rules of treaty and statutory interpretation. The Indian law canon of
construction that deal with treaties states that ambiguities in
treaties should be construed in the favor of Indian tribes and that
treaties should be read as the Indians would have understood
them.14 The Indian law canon of construction that pertains to
9

See Treaty of Fort Laramie with Sioux, Etc., Sept. 17, 1851, 11 Stat. 749
[hereinafter Treaty of Fort Laramie].
10
See, e.g., Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 749; Treaty with the Ottowa, Etc.,
1807, art. 7, Nov. 17, 1807, 7 Stat. 105 (“The said nations of Indians
acknowledge themselves to be under the protection of the United States, and no
other power, and will prove by their conduct that they are worthy of so great a
blessing.”).
11
See Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. United States, 117 U.S. 288, 295
(1886) (“By this treaty the Cherokees were recognized as one people,
composing one nation, but subject, however, to the jurisdiction and authority of
the government of the United States, which could regulate their trade and
manage all their affairs.”).
12
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 11 (1831) (“Their relations to the
United States resemble that of a ward to his guardian.”)
13
Id. (“They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and
power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the President as their
great father.”).
14
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832).

701

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 5:308

statutory interpretation states that “statutes passed for the benefit of
dependent Indian tribes or communities are to be liberally
construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in the favor of the
Indians.”15 Both of the rules that comprise the Indian law canons of
construction allow the Court to place the proper weight on the trust
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes when
engaging in treaty and statutory interpretation.
The Indian law canons of construction are born out of the trust
relationship. When the Court uses the Indian law canons to
interpret a treaty or statute, they are affirming the trust
relationship16. The Indian law canons of construction affirm the
moral obligation between the United States and Indian tribes
because they recognize the imbalance that exists in the relationship
between tribes and the United States, thus moving the needle
towards a more equal relationship. Indian tribes have always been
at a disadvantage in dealing with the United States within the
context of the trust relationship.17 During the treaty-making period,
tribes often times did not understand the terms of the treaties that
they were entering into because they were written in English,
which many tribal leaders did not speak.18Treaties are essentially
contracts between nations. Using the Indian law canons of
construction, to interpret an ambiguity in a treaty in favor of Indian
tribes, is analogous to applying the rule in contract law that
ambiguities in a contract should be construed in favor of the party
that did not draft the contract language.19 This rule recognizes the
position of power that a party holds when drafting a contract. The
rule that ambiguous terms in a treaty should be construed in the
favor of the non-drafting Indian tribe recognizes the power

15

Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co., 248 U.S. at 89-90.
See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. at 581 (where the Court created the Indian canon
of construction); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2 (recognizing the trust
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes).
17
See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 52
(1987) (“If Indians are involved, you should infuse all federal laws, old and new,
with the policy of the special Indian trust relationship and read those laws with a
heavy bias in favor of Indian and tribal prerogatives.”).
18
See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 582 (“How the words of the treaty were understood
by this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule
of construction.”).
19
United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 210 (1970).
16
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dynamic that existed between Indian tribes and the United States
during the treaty-making period.20
Chief Justice John Marshall and Justice John McLean
constructed the rule about ambiguities in treaties between the
United States and Indian tribes should be construed in the favor of
the Indians.21 In 1832, in Worcester v. State of Georgia, Justice
McLean22 wrote, “The language used in treaties with the Indians
should never be construed to their prejudice.”23 The Supreme
Court cited Justice McLean’s rule of treaty interpretation in
numerous cases throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
to support their application of the Indian law canons of
construction.
In 1866, In re Kansas Indians, the Court held that the State of
Kansas had no right to tax the lands held by individual members of
the Shawnee, Miami, and Wea Tribes.24 The sought a narrow
construction of a provision in the treaty at issue. The particular
provision exempted the tribal lands from “levy, sale, execution,
and forfeiture.”25 The State tried to argue that this provision only
applied to a levy or a sale under judicial proceedings. 26 However,
the Court interpreted the treaty provision in favor of the tribes.27
In 1886, the Court held in Choctaw Nation v. United States that
the Choctaw nation was entitled to a judgment against the United
States for lands that were taken from it and for annuities the United
States had failed to pay.28 The Nation had sued, alleging that the
United States had breached the treaty of September 27, 1830,
20

Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1899) (for an explanation of why an
imbalance in negotiating position matters in interpreting Indian treaties).
21
See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 582 (“The language used in treaties with the Indians
should never be construed to their prejudice. … “How the words of the treaty
were understood by this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning,
should form the rule construction.”).
22
John McLean (1785-1861) was a United States Representative, Postmaster
General, and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1829-1861). He was one
of the two dissenting justices in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
23
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 582.
24
In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 760-61 (1866).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. (“[E]nlarged rules of construction are adopted in reference to Indian
treaties. In speaking of these rules, Chief Justice Marshall says: ‘The language
used in treaties with the Indians shall never be construed to their prejudice, if
words be made us of which are susceptible of a more extended meaning that the
tenor of their treaty.’”)(quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. at 582).
28
Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1886).
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between the Choctaw and the United States.29 The United States
argued that the Choctaw were not entitled to the proceeds from the
sale of their lands. The Court interpreted the phrase “shall be
allowed” in the treaty to award the Choctaw the proceeds of the
sale of the lands which the United States sold that had been ceded
by the Tribe under the treaty of 1830.30 To support its construction
of “shall be allowed” in favor of the Choctaw the Court cited
Worcester.31
In 1930, in Carpenter v. Shaw, the Court held that the State of
Oklahoma could not tax the petroleum and natural gas royalties of
members of the Choctaw nation that stemmed from fossil fuel
extraction on their allotments.32 The tribal members alleged that
the State had assessed taxes on their petroleum royalties.33 The
State argued that the royalties were not exempt because the tribal
members could alienate their allotted lands. If the lands were able
to be alienated then they were subject to State taxation.34 To the
State, the leasing of the petroleum rights by the tribal members was
an alienation of the tribal member’s allotments that was subject to
state taxation.35 The Court held that the tribal members were
exempt from taxation on their petroleum royalties because an
exemption had been secured by the tribe in its agreement with the
United States. Even though this exemption did not expressly say
that the royalties in particular were exempt from State taxation, the
Court applied the Indian law canons of construction, and construed
both the Allotment Act and the treaty at issue in favor of the tribe
and its members.36
In 1973, in McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona,
the Court held that the Arizona state individual income tax was
unlawful when applied to a Navajo tribal member living on the
reservation, who derived their income solely from work on the
reservation.37 In McClanahan, a member of the Navajo Nation
29

Id.
Id. at 33.
31
Id. at 27-28 (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. at 582) (“The language used in
treaties with the Indians shall never be construed to their prejudice.”).
32
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
33
Id. at 365.
34
Id. at 366.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 366-367.
37
McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).
30
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who worked solely on the Navajo reservation brought suit when
$16.20 was held out of her paycheck by the state of Arizona.38 The
Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the tribal member was not
exempt from state taxation and was not entitled to a tax refund.39
The Court cited to Carpenter, in ruling for the tribal member,
noting that though the 1868 treaty between the United States and
the Navajo nation did not explicitly state that the Navajo were to
be free from state taxes, the fact that the lands of the Navajo
reservation were reserved for the exclusive use and occupancy
established the exclusive sovereignty of the Navajo under federal
supervision.40
It should be noted too that Congress itself, which holds
“plenary and exclusive powers to legislate in respect to Indian
Tribes,” essentially followed the language given by Justice
McLean in Worcester, when it wrote and enacted 25 U.S.C. §194
in 1834.41 §194 states that, in a dispute over property involving an
Indian and a non-Indian party, the burden of proof rests with the
non-Indian party whenever an Indian makes out a presumption of
title from the fact of a previous possession or ownership.42 §194
has been cited by the courts in several decisions concerning
disputes over lands between Indians and non-Indians.43 The
statute’s most notable recitation by the Court was in Oneida
County v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, finding that the
tribe could maintain its action for the violation of their possessory
rights of land that they had held aboriginal title to in New York
State.44

38

Id. at 166.
Id.
40
Id. at 174 (quoting Carpenter, 280 U.S. at 367) (“(d)oubtful expressions are to
be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of
the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.”).
41
U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004).
42
25 U.S.C § 194 (2012).
43
See, e.g., U.S. v. Trujillo, 853 F.2d 800 (10th Cir. 1988); A&A Concrete, Inc. v.
White Mountain Apache Tribe, 781 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1986); Begay v. Albers,
721 F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1983).
44
Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 226,
239 (1985).
39
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Alaska Pacific Fisheries and the Birth of the Statutory
Canon

From Justice McLean’s rule, the Court then created the Indian
law canon, that “statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian
tribes or communities are to be liberally construed, doubtful
expressions being resolved in the favor of the Indians.”45This
proposition first appeared in 1918, in the Court’s opinion in Alaska
Pacific Fisheries Co. v. United States. Justice Willis Van Devanter
wrote the Court’s opinion and used this language to uphold the
fishing rights of the residents of the Native Alaskan village of
Metlakatla. The rule pronounced by the Court protected the fishing
rights of Metlakatla by filling in the gaps in the statute that
established the reservation on the Annette Islands in modern-day
Alaska.46 In 1916, the Alaska Pacific Fisheries Company built a
fish trap near one of the reservation’s islands. The company
intended to catch approximately six hundred thousand salmon
every season.47 Congress had failed to explicitly state in the statute
whether the waters around the islands were part of the reservation.
The question before the Court was therefore one of construction:
What was Congress’ intention when it set aside the Annette Islands
for the Metlakatla Indians?48 Since the islands had little arable
land, the Court concluded that Congress must have intended to set
aside the waters surrounding the islands as well as the islands
themselves; otherwise, the Metlakatla Indians would have been
unable to sustain themselves.49
There is no doubt that the statute creating the Metlakatla
reservation was passed for the village’s benefit. The Court’s Rule,
derived from Justice McLean’s earlier formulation, that ambiguous
language in treaties should be construed in the favor of Indians
allowed him to write a favorable opinion for the Metlakatla
Indians. The Court was able to make the connection between the
statute and the treaty canon because the statute was very similar to
a treaty between the United States and the Metlakatla Indians. The
45

Alaska Pacific Fisheries, 248 U.S. at 89-90 (1918).
Indian Appropriation Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1101 (as
codified at Comp St. 1916 § 5096a.).
47
Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co., 248 U.S. at 87.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 87-89
46
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statute, similar to prior treaties between the United States and other
Indian tribes, promised the Metlakatla the Annette Islands and the
use of the Annette Islands to sustain their community.50 Because of
the similarities between the statute and the many treaties, which
the United States had entered into with Indian tribes, the Court was
able to create the Indian law canon of construction that statutes
must be construed liberally in favor of Indians.51 A statute that
regulated Indian affairs, like a treaty, is an exercise of the trust
relationship that exists between a tribe and Congress.52 Thus, a
maxim that ambiguities, in statutes that regulate Indian affairs,
should be construed in favor of tribes affirms the trust relationship
by tilting the relationship towards tribal interests because they did
not write the statutes and are likely to have little to no voice in
their creation and enactment.
C.
Legislative History: The Trust Relationship Necessitates
the use of Legislative History when Interpreting Statutes that
Regulate Indian Affairs
Legislative history can assist a judge in cases that deal with
statutory interpretation. Attorneys and judges can look to the
legislative history of a statute in order to determine the legislative
intent behind Congress’ enactment of the statute53. Additionally,
the Court can consult the legislative history of the statute to clarify
any ambiguous language in the statute. The materials that make up
legislative history are the bills, committee hearings, congressional
debates, and other documents. These materials are compiled while

50

Id. at 86-87
Id. at 86
52
See Section 15 of the Act of March 3, 1891, C. 561, 26 Stat. 1101 (“That until
otherwise provided by law the body of lands known as Annette Islands, situated
in Alexander Archipelago in southeastern Alaska, on the north side of Dixon's
entrance, be, and the same is hereby, set apart as a reservation for the use of the
Metlakahtla Indians, and those people known as Metlakahtlans who have
recently emigrated from British Columbia to Alaska, and such other Alaskan
Native s as may join them, to be held and used by them in common, under such
rules and regulations, and subject to such restrictions, as may [be] prescribed
from time to time by the Secretary of the Interior.”)
53
KATE M. MANUEL, BRANDON J. MURRILL & ANDREW NOLAN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R 44419, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA: HIS JURISPRUDENCE AND
HIS IMPACT ON THE COURT 6-7 (2016).
51
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a bill still resides within Congress, and before it is signed into law
by the President.54
Legislative history is vitally important to statutory
interpretation in Indian law because of the trust relationship
between the United States and Indian tribes, and the authority that
Congress has over Indian affairs. Every statute that Congress
enacts, in terms of Indian policy, is Congress exerting its plenary
power over Indian tribes.
The Court has long recognized that Congress has plenary
power over Indian tribes that is nearly omnipotent in nature.55 The
Court has never held as unconstitutional a statute enacted by
Congress that regulates Indian affairs.56 Thus, Indian tribes are
truly at the mercy of any statute that Congress enacts that regulates
Indian affairs. This unequal relationship shows the importance of
using legislative history to aid in statutory interpretation in Indian
law, and the positive effect that the Indian law canons of
construction can have in ensuring that the trust relationship is
respected by the Court. The nearly unchecked power that Congress
holds to regulate Indian affairs calls for the Court to consider the
legislative history of the statute and the intent of Congress in
enacting the statute when the statute regulates Indian affairs. The
nearly supreme position that Congress holds over regulating Indian
affairs and the nature of the trust relationship calls for the Court to
use the Indian law canons of construction in interpreting treaties
and statutes because Congress has a moral obligation to tribes to
protect their interests. The use of the Indian law canons of
construction helps to ensure that ambiguous statutes are interpreted
in the favor of Indian tribes. This is a fulfillment of the trust
relationship because, on its face, any statute that Congress enacts
54

Id.
See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and
the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1139 n.10
(1990) (quoting Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192
(1989)(“the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide
Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs”); Rice v.
Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 719 (1983) (“‘The sovereignty that the Indian Tribes
retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of
Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.’”) (quoting United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (emphasis in Rice)); Federal Power over
Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984)).
56
Philip Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1990).
55
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that regulates Indian affairs should benefit the Indian tribe
impacted by the statute, due to the trust responsibility and moral
obligation that Congress has to look after Indian interests. The use
of legislative history and respect for congressional intent has
played a role in several cases where the Court was able to craft an
opinion that respected the trust relationship between tribes and the
United States.
II.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN INDIAN LAW AND THE
COURT BEFORE JUSTICE SCALIA: AN APPROACH ROOTED IN
HISTORY AND THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP
Before Justice Scalia was appointed to the Court in 1986, the
Court used legislative history, as well as the Indian law canons of
construction in a series of cases that limited the power of state
governments as they sought to intrude into the sphere of tribal
sovereignty. In particular, three cases show how the Court used the
Indian law canons of construction and legislative history to craft
decisions in harmony with congressional intent and the moral
obligation that the trust relationship imposes upon Congress, to act
in the best interests of Indian tribes in enacting statutes that
regulate Indian affairs.
In 1968, in Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, the
Court held that the hunting and fishing rights of the Menominee
Tribe of Wisconsin were preserved by the Wolf River Treaty of
1854.57 The Court ruled in favor of the Tribe, even though the
Tribe’s status as a federally recognized Tribe had been terminated
by Congress in 195458. In 1976, in Bryan v. Itasca County, the
petitioner Russell Bryan was an enrolled member of the Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe. Bryan lived in a mobile home located on trust
lands on the Leech Lake Reservation in Minnesota.59 Bryan asked
for a declaratory judgment from the Court, preventing Itasca
County and the state of Minnesota from taxing him because Itasca
County, where the reservation is located, had sought to collect
personal property tax on the mobile home for $147.95.60 The Court

57

Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 405-406 (1968).
Id. at 405-406
59
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 375 (1976).
60
Id. at 375.
58
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held for Bryan, ruling against the efforts of the 61State and County
to tax Bryan. In 1985, the Court decided Montana v. Blackfeet. The
case concerned the taxing of mineral royalties by the State of
Montana on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation. The Court had to
interpret between two different statutes. The Court used the Indian
law canons of construction to interpret the statutes and ultimately
held for the Tribe.
A.

Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States

In 1968, the Court held that the Menominee Tribe retained its
hunting and fishing rights; despite the fact that its status as a
federally recognized Indian Tribe had been terminated by Congress
in 1954.62 The State of Wisconsin argued that the hunting and
fishing rights of the Menominee had been abrogated by the passage
of the Termination Act of 1954, which terminated the
Menominee’s status as a federally recognized Indian Tribe.63
Justice William Douglas, ruling in favor of the Tribe, used the
Indian canons of construction and legislative history to find that
the Tribe retained its hunting and fishing rights despite being
terminated.64 Though the 1854 treaty between the United States
and the Tribe did not explicitly state that the Menominee were to
keep their hunting and fishing rights, the Court interpreted the
ambiguities in the treaty in favor of the Tribe and held that they
had retained their hunting and fishing rights by entering into the
treaty with the United States.65 In examining the legislative history
in an effort to seek out Congressional intent, the Court looked at
the Termination Act of 1954, and other Indian related legislation
passed during the same Congress, and statements by legislators.66
In examining the Termination Act of 1954, the Court found that
there was no explicit mention of preserving the hunting and fishing
rights of the Tribe.67 Though there was not an explicit mention of
61

Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 405-406.
63
Id. at 408-410.
64
Id. at 412-413.
65
Id. at 406 (“The essence of the Treaty of Wolf River was that the Indians were
authorized to maintain on the new lands ceded to them as a reservation their way
of life which included hunting and fishing.”).
66
Id. at 409-411, 413.
67
Id. at 408.
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preserving the hunting and fishing rights of the Tribe, the Court did
not find this ambiguity to be an implied repeal of the Tribe’s
hunting and fishing rights. Instead, the Court looked at 18 U.S.C.
§1162, which was passed only two months after the Termination
Act of 1854. Though, §1162 granted Wisconsin and other states
jurisdiction over criminal and civil offenses committed on Indian
reservations, the statute still preserved the treaty rights of
tribes.68To Justice Douglas, this meant that “although federal
supervision of the Tribe was to cease and all tribal property was to
be transferred to new hands, the hunting and fishing rights granted
or preserved by the Wolf River Treaty of 1854 survived the
Termination Act of 1954.”69
To decide that Congress never had the intent to abrogate the
Wolf River Treaty of 1854, the Court looked at the words of the
Senate Indian Affairs Committee Chairman, Arthur Watkins of
Utah, who said upon the passage of the Termination Act of 1954
that it “in no way violates any treaty obligation with this
Tribe.”70By using the Indian law canons of Construction along
with the legislative history surrounding the Termination Act of
1954, the Court was able to write an opinion in Menominee that
upheld the trust responsibility between the United States and the
Tribe, even though the Tribe had been terminated by Congress.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote the dissent in Menominee, in
which he was joined by Justice Hugo Black.71The dissent’s
argument is a textual argument that relies upon the plain meaning
of the text in the Termination Act of 1954 and §1162. The dissent
begins by acknowledging that the language of the Wolf River
Treaty of 1854 unambiguously conferred special hunting and
fishing rights to the Menominee within the boundaries of their
reservation.72The dissent then uses textualism to argue that the
Menominee have not maintained their hunting and fishing rights
because those rights have been abrogated by the passage of statutes
by Congress.73

68

Id. at 408.
Id. at 411.
70
Id. at 413.
71
Id. at 413.
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Id. at 413-414.
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Id. at 414-416.
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The dissent’s textual argument relies upon two points. First that
the Termination Act of 1954 contains no explicit language that
pertains to the hunting and fishing rights of the Menominee.74 The
dissent writes “The statute is plain on its face: after termination,
the Menominee are fully subject to state laws just are other citizens
are, and no exception is made for hunting and fishing laws.”75The
dissent is correct, there is no exception made in the Termination
Act of 1954 for the hunting and fishing rights of the Menominee.
The dissent does not however consider that because the
Termination Act of 1954 fails to explicitly deal with the hunting
and fishing rights of the Menominee that an ambiguity then exists.
The majority solves the problem of this ambiguity by the use of
stare decisis, relying upon the principle that the abrogation of an
Indian treaty by Congress must be explicitly, and by looking at the
legislative history, in particular the statements of the legislator
responsible for the Termination Act of 1954, Senator
Watkins.76The second textual argument that the dissent makes is
that the majority falsely relies upon the principle of in pari
materia77, because the text of §1162 stated that the continuation of
special hunting and fishing rights were to be maintained in Indian
Country and the Termination Act of 1954 abolished the
Menominee reservation, the dissent saw no need to apply §1162 to
the Menominee.
The fatal flaw in the dissent’s argument here is that §1162 was
passed two months after the passage of the Termination Act of
1954, both statutes went through the same committees, and same
Congress, and were signed into law by the same President, and
§1162 became effective seven years before the Termination Act of
1854, meaning that when §1162 was enacted the Menominee
reservation was still Indian Country within the definition of
§1162.78 Clearly Congress intended for §1162 to apply to the
Menominee Reservation or it would have said something to
exclude the Menominee. By looking at the legislative history of the
two statutes, and considering the two statutes in pari materia, the
74

Id. at 415-416.
Id. at 415.
76
Id. at 413.
77
In pari materia, in which statutes that are enacted at different times but
concern the same subject matter are interpreted in light of each other.
78
Id. at 410-411.
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majority succeeds where the dissent fails, and crafts an opinion in
Menominee that considers Congressional intent, upholds treaty
rights, and interprets the ambiguities in both statutes in favor of the
Menominee, thus adhering to the Indian law canons of
construction.
B.

Bryan v. Itasca County

In Bryan v. Itasca County, Justice William Brennan follows the
framework that this note suggests is the ideal framework for the
Court to use in Indian law cases that involve questions of statutory
interpretation. The Court uses legislative history and congressional
intent, as well as, the Indian law canons of construction to write an
opinion in Bryan that is in harmony with the trust relationship.79
In Bryan, the state of Minnesota and Itasca County sought to
use 18 U.S.C. § 1160 and 18 U.S.C. § 1360 to justify their taxation
of Bryan.80 The State argued that, in passing PL.280, Congress
placed the Leech Lake Indian Reservation under the civil
jurisdiction of the state.81 The State then argued that, since the
reservation was subject to Minnesota’s civil jurisdiction, Bryan
was also subject to the taxing powers of the state and local
government.82
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan used legislative
history to show that Congress did not intend to make the Leech
Lake Indian Reservation and Bryan subject to the taxing powers of
the state and local governments by passing PL. 280.83 One of the
ways that the Court did this was by considering, not only the text
of PL. 280; but also, the intervening legislative enactments of

79

Bryan, 426 U.S. at 381.
18 U.S.C. § 1160 (2006) and 18 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006) together compose
Public Law 280, hereinafter they will collectively be referred to as PL. 280. PL.
280 was passed by Congress in response to what it saw as lawlessness on some
Indian reservations. PL. 280 granted the states authority over some civil and
criminal matters on some Indian reservations. PL. 280 was passed in 1953 when
Congress was pursuing the goal of further assimilating Indians into the larger
non-Indian society. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 379-386 (1976)
for a discussion of the legislative history and congressional intent behind PL.
280.
81
Bryan, 426 U.S. at 378-379.
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Id. at 375.
83
Id. at 381.
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Congress since the statute was first passed in 1953.84 For example,
the Court notes that the passage of 28 U.S.C. §1360(c) by
Congress “contemplates the continuing vitality of tribal
government.”85 The position that the State and the County seeks to
subordinate the Leech Lake Reservation Tribal Council to both the
state and the local county government.86 This position would strip
the tribal government of its sovereignty and lessen its viability.
The Court seeks for the intent of Congress when it cites the
testimony of Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, who was
involved in the passage of PL. 280, who said “Public Law 280
relates primarily to the application of state civil and criminal law in
court proceedings” to show that Congress did not intend to extend
to states the taxing authority over tribes when it passed PL. 280;
but rather sought only to extend criminal and civil authority to
states over some tribes.87 Lastly, the Court notes that, though there
is some ambiguity in the statute, the Indian law canons of
construction call upon the Court to construe these ambiguities in
favor of the Tribe.88 The Court looks at the legislative history
behind the statute to discern the intent of Congress; and, where an
ambiguity still exists, it then applies the Indian law canons of
construction. By applying this framework, the Court is able to
construct an opinion that is mindful of the trust relationship that
exists between the Tribe and the United States.
C.

Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians

The Court’s 1985 decision in Blackfeet Tribe89 powerfully
reaffirmed Indian law canons of construction found in a line of
cases stretching back for over 150 years. The question in Blackfeet
was whether the State of Montana could tax the royalty interests of
the Tribe made from oil and gas produced on the reservation.90 To
decide whether the State could tax the oil and gas royalties of the
84

Id. at 387-389.
Id. at 376; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c) (2012) (provides for the full force and
effect of tribal ordinances and customs that do not conflict with any applicable
civil laws of a state).
86
Bryan, 426 U.S. at 375.
87
Id. at 387.
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Id. at 392 (citing Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. U.S. 248 U.S. 78 (1918)).
89
Montana, 471 U.S. at 761.
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Id. at 761.
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Tribe, the Court had to interpret the Indian Mineral and Leasing
Act of 1938.91 In 1924, Congress amended the 1891 statute that
permitted mineral leasing on Indian lands.92 The amended 1924
Act explicitly allowed states like Montana to tax oil, gas, and
mineral production on tribally held lands, stating that “the
production of oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may be
taxed by the State in which said lands are located.”93 In 1938,
Congress passed the Indian Mineral and Leasing Act of 1938
(IMLA). The IMLA did not explicitly repeal the tax found in the
1924 statute, nor did it authorize such a tax.94 The Indian Mineral
and Leasing Act of 1938 did include a general repeal clause, which
read, “all Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent here with are hereby
repealed.”95 The state of Montana imposed taxes on the mineral
royalties of the Tribe and its members citing the ability to do so
under the 1924 statute.96
Writing for the Court, Justice Byron White held that the State
of Montana was unable to tax the mineral royalties of the Tribe.
The Court noted that the standard principles of statutory
construction do not have the same weight in Indian law that they
do in other fields of the law, writing “the canons of construction
applicable in Indian law are rooted in the unique trust relationship
between the United States and the Indians.”97 In light of the unique
trust relationship between the Tribe and the United States, the
canon of statutory construction the Court found did apply was the
Indian law canons of construction that, “statutes are to be
construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous
provisions interpreted to their benefit.”98
By applying the Indian law canons of construction to the 1924
and 1938 statutes, the Court found that the State’s interpretation of
the statutes did not meet the rule requiring that the statutes be
construed liberally in favor of the Tribe.99 The Court specifically
cites that the trust relationship requires that the Court apply the
91

Id. at 762; see also 25 U.S.C. § 396 (2012).
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Indian law canons of construction to its interpretation of the 1924
and 1938 statutes.100 The Court did not stop simply at using the
Indian law canons of construction to write an opinion that is in
harmony with the trust relationship and fulfills the moral
obligation that exists between the United States and the Blackfeet
Tribe. The Court also looked to the legislative history of the 1938
Act to find what the intent of Congress was in enacting the statute.
The Court wrote:
Nothing in either the text, or
legislative history of the 1938 Act,
suggests that Congress intended to
permit States to tax Tribal royalty
income generated by leases issued
pursuant to that Act. The statute
contains no explicit consent to state
taxation. Nor is there any indication
that Congress intended to incorporate
implicitly in the 1938 Act the taxing
authority of the 1924 act.101
The Court’s consideration of the legislative history of the 1938 act
is important because, by examining the legislative history of the
act, the Court is seeking out the intent that Congress had when it
passed the statute. Congressional intent matters greatly in
interpreting statutes that regulate Indian affairs because of the
plenary power that Congress has to regulate Indian affairs. The
Court, in crafting its opinion, has examined all of the elements that
the Court should consider in crafting an opinion that is at harmony
with the trust relationship and the moral obligation that the United
States owes to a tribe. The Court considers the trust relationship,
keeping it in the back of its mind as it moves through its statutory
interpretation, concluding that the trust relationship compels the
Court to use the Indian law canons of construction to interpret the
statute then, to ensure that the government to government
relationship between the Tribe and Congress is respected, the
Court then examines the legislative history of the statute in

100
101

Id. at 767.
Id.
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question. By using this three-part framework, the Court is able to
weave an opinion that is in harmony with the trust relationship and
fulfills the moral obligation that Congress has to the Tribe.
III.

TEXTUALISM ALLOWS THE COURT TO IGNORE THE TRUST
RELATIONSHIP

Since the dawn of the Rehnquist Court in 1986, and proceeding
into the Roberts Court in 2005, Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice
Clarence Thomas, Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Samuel Alito
have all used textualism to render decisions in cases involving
statutory interpretation in Indian law that have largely ignored the
trust relationship, the intent of Congress in passing the statute, and
the Indian law canons of construction. These decisions have all had
a negative impact on Indian tribes on a number of different issues
ranging from criminal justice, tax, child custody, Indian gaming,
and land into trust.
Justice Scalia looked only to the plain meaning of the words in
the context within, which they are found in a statute.102 Justice
Scalia was not a proponent of using extrinsic evidence to provide
definitions for the words in a statute. He held in particular disdain
the practice of using legislative history to show that a word meant
a specific definition.103 He stated, “I don’t care what the legislators
intended. I care what the fair meaning of this word is.” 104 Justice
Scalia did not care to use legislative history to interpret the
meaning of a statute because he believed that doing so was
unconstitutional. In discussing the use of committee reports and
floor speeches to define the meaning of a statute he stated, “[I]t is
an unconstitutional practice to say that the meaning of statute
which the full Congress adopted is going to be determined by a
committee or, indeed by a single individual speaking on the floor
of Congress.”105 As previously discussed, because Congress has an
almost supreme authority over Indian affairs, the intent of
102

Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and
Constitutional Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1616 (2012).
103
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621,
651 (1990) (“After his elevation to the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia has
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the Court should ignore legislative history.”).
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Congress in enacting a statute is extremely important. Using the
plain meaning of a word in statute can lead to the Court
interpreting a statute in a case involving a statute that regulates
Indian affairs in a way that renders a decision at odds with both the
trust relationship and the original intent that Congress had in
enacting the statute.
To a strict textualist like Justice Scalia, a rule of statutory
construction like the Indian law canons of construction was
irksome. In his treatise on statutory interpretation, A Matter of
Interpretation, Justice Scalia directly addressed the Indian law
canons of construction and other rules of statutory construction.
Justice Scalia wrote that “these preferential rules and presumptions
are a lot of trouble.”106 Of the Indian law canons of construction,
specifically, Justice Scalia said, “Every statute that comes into
litigation is to some degree ‘ambiguous’; how ambiguous does
ambiguity have to be before the rule in favor of Indians
applies?”107 Justice Scalia then asked whether the Court even
possessed the authority to create such a rule of statutory
construction. Justice Scalia stated that, “[t]here is also the question
of where the courts get the authority to impose them. Can we really
just decree that we will interpret the laws that Congress passes to
mean less or more than they fairly say? I doubt it.”108 The brand of
textualism that Justice Scalia espoused that has been adopted by
the Court makes no exception for the use of legislative history or
the Indian law canons of construction when engaging in statutory
interpretation in Indian law. The emergence of the use of
textualism as the leading tool for statutory interpretation in regard
to statutes that regulate Indian affairs has effectively rendered the
Indian law canons of construction obsolete.
Each Justice has had their own approach to using textualism to
interpret ambiguities in statutes that regulated Indian affairs.
However, the approach embraced by the Court’s former foremost
proponent of textualism, Justice Scalia, is particularly problematic
for the trust relationship. Justice Scalia’s textualism is emblematic
of the problem that using textualism in reading a statute that
regulates Indian affairs poses to the trust relationship because it
106
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ignores legislative history and the Indian law canons of
construction. The use of textualism by the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts to interpret statutes that regulate Indian affairs is different
than the approach that was previously embraced by the Court.
IV.

THE INDIAN LAW CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION AND THE
REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS: THE VITIATING OF THE INDIAN
LAW CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION
As we will see from the cases that follow the adoption of the
use of textualism for statutory interpretation by the Court is in
many of the Indian law decisions that the Court has decided since
Chief Justice Burger left the Court in 1986.109 The consistent
thread throughout Indian law cases that involve statutory
interpretation is that the Indian interest, more often than not, loses
when textualism is used to interpret a statute rather than the Indian
law canons of construction. In these cases, the majority pays little
to no attention to the trust relationship and shows a total disregard
for the moral obligation that the United States has to the Tribe. The
Court has come to treat questions of statutory interpretation in
Indian law as simple binary problems that elicit a simple “yes” or
“no” answer that can only be found in the text of the statute. Indian
law is simply not binary like criminal law, where a person is only
guilty or not guilty, because of the intricacies and complexities
brought to Indian law by the unique trust relationship between the
United States and tribes, Indian law cannot be simply binary. There
are five hundred and sixty-six federally recognized tribes in the
United States, and the trust relationship and moral obligation that
the United States has with each tribe is unique to that Tribe.110 The
Indian law canons of construction allow for and respect how
unique the trust relationship is. Each statute is liberally construed
in favor of the Indian tribe involved in the case. The Indian law
canons of construction are not beholden to the simple black and
white text of a statute.

109
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Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village

In 1991, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion in Blatchford v.
Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village.111 The case involved
a question of statutory interpretation centered around whether the
enactment of 28 U.S.C. §1362 by Congress was an abrogation of
Eleventh Amendment immunity from the state of Alaska by
Congress. This allowed the Native villages involved in the case to
sue the state of Alaska.112
The text of 28 U.S.C. § 1362 reads:
The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions,
brought by any Indian Tribe or band
with a governing body duly
recognized by the Secretary of the
Interior, wherein the matter in
controversy arises
under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.113
In 1980, the State of Alaska passed a statute which, provided
twenty five thousand dollars
annually to Native village
governments located, in the state that were not part of a state
municipally-chartered community.114 Due to concerns from the
state’s Attorney General, the state repealed and replaced the statute
and expanded the program to all communities.115 The expansion of
the program reduced the funds that the Native villages would
receive.116 The Native villages sued seeking an order requiring the
state to pay them the full $25,000.00 that they were entitled to
under the original statute.117 In order to be able to sue the state of
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Alaska, the Native villages argued that 28 U.S.C. §1362 allowed
their suit to move forward.118
The Court held that §1362 did not expressly contain an
abrogation of the sovereign immunity of the states against Native
American tribes.119 The Court wrote that if Congress were to waive
the sovereign immunity of the states from suit by Native American
tribes, then such a waiver needed to be made with an
“unmistakably clear intent to abrogate immunity, made plain in the
language of the statute.120 The Court did not find in §1362 a plain
and unambiguous waiver of Alaska’s immunity from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment, and so ruled against the Native villages.121
The Court used textualism to rule against the Native villages in
Blatchford. In contrast to the majority, Justice Blackmun instead
used the Indian canons of construction in his dissent to argue
against the conclusion that the Court reached. Specifically, Justice
Blackmun cited the Indian law canon of construction “that statutes
passed for the benefit of Indian tribes are to be liberally construed,
with doubtful expressions resolved in the favor of the Indians.”122
On its face, §1362 may appear to only be a procedural statute; but
if it is interpreted using the Indian law canons of construction in a
way that is in harmony with the trust relationship, then the benefit
to Indian tribes is obvious. Interpreted in the favor of Indian tribes,
§1362 allows Indian tribes to sue states, effectively giving them
the same power that states possess—the power to sue another state.
Both the state of Alaska and Justice Scalia did not make the
argument that §1362 was not passed for the benefit of Indian
tribes. In order to rule against the Native villages on the question
of whether or not §1362 had abrogated the sovereign immunity of
the state of Alaska from suit from Indian tribes, Justice Scalia
completely ignored both the Indian law canons of construction and
the trust relationship that exists between the United States and the
Native villages. Instead, had the Court crafted an opinion in
Blatchford that was in harmony with the trust relationship, and
used the Indian law canons of construction to interpret §1362. The
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Court would have furthered tribal sovereignty by placing tribes and
states on a more equal legal footing.
B.

County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation

In 1992, Justice Scalia used the plain text of the General
Allotment Act123 to rule against the Confederated Tribes and
Bands of Yakima Indian Nation in a dispute over the State of
Washington’s ability to tax fee lands owned by the Tribe and its
members on the Tribe’s reservation.124 The Allotment Act was
signed into law by President Grover Cleveland in 1887.125 The
supreme aim of the Act was to substitute white civilization for
tribal culture by making farmers out of individual Indians. To
achieve this aim, the Act granted one hundred and sixty acres to
the head of each Indian household and, after twenty five years, the
land would be issued to the individual Indian landowners in fee,
then it could be alienated and encumbered.126 It was hoped that the
individual Indian land owners would farm their individual
allotments; and embrace the principles of individual ownership of
land and capitalism embraced by white civilization, and move
away from the principle of collective tribal ownership of land long
adhered to by Indian tribes.127
Both the Tribe and the United States argued that the Tribe was
not subject to taxation because §6 of the General Allotment Act
was defunct; even though, it had not been explicitly repealed by
Congress.128 The Tribe argued that, since Congress shifted Indian
policy away from the policy of allotment when it enacted the
Indian Reorganization Act,129 that this shift was effectively an
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Also known as the Dawes Act, named after its primary author Senator Henry
Dawes of Massachusetts.
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County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 253 (1992); see also 25 U.S.C. § 388 (1929).
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History of the Allotment Policy: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House
Comm. On Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 428-85 (1934) (statement of Delos Sacket
Otis, Historian, employed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to write a history of
allotment under Dawes Act.)
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County of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 259-260.
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implied repeal of the General Allotment Act and §6.130 The
legislative history of the Indian Reorganization Act supports the
Tribe’s position.131 In a memorandum to the Senate and House
Committees on Indian Affairs, John Collier, the architect of the
Indian Reorganization Act, wrote of the woes brought onto tribes
by the Allotment Act and the need for the reform offered by the
passage of the Indian Reorganization Act. Mr. Collier wrote that
the Act “creates between the Indians and the Government a
relationship barren, embittered, full of contempt and despair,” and
that it was apparent that the Allotment Act had created an
“administrative impossibility.”132 After receiving Mr. Collier’s
memorandum regarding the negative impact that the Allotment Act
had on Indian tribes, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization
Act in 1934 by a resounding margin.133 As further evidence that
Congress had repealed §6 by implication, the Tribe pointed to the
fact that in 1948 Congress had defined Indian country to “include
all fee land within the boundaries of an existing reservation,
whether or not held by an Indian.”134
The Court rebutted the Tribe’s argument that the actions of
Congress in passing the Indian Reorganization Act, and other
legislative enactments, amounted to an implied repeal of §6. The
Court examined the text of §6 and found no explicit language that
exempted the lands in question from state and local taxation. The
Court then stated that it was a “cardinal rule that repeals by
implication are not favored,” and proceeded to rule against the
Tribe. The plain language of §6 states that once an allottee is
granted a patent in fee simple that “thereafter all restrictions as to
sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be removed.”135
Justice Scalia argued that in Congress’ 1934 enactment of 25
U.S.C. § 461, Congress chose to not return allotted land to its preAllotment Act status. He found this to be further proof that §6 was
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County of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 260-261.
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Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the Senate and Indian House Committees on
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not repealed by implication.136 The decision that the Court
rendered in Yakima ignored the Indian law canons of construction,
the intent of Congress behind changes in Indian policy after the
passage of the Allotment Act, and the trust relationship.
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Yakima crafts a result that is in
harmony with the trust relationship and pays respect to the plenary
power of Congress over Indian affairs by using the Indian law
canons of construction and congressional intent. Justice Blackmun
wrote:
[T]he Court mistakenly assumes that
it cannot give any effect to the many
complex
intervening
statutes
reflecting a complete turnabout in
federal Indian policy—now aimed at
preserving Tribal integrity and the
Indian land base—since enactment at
the turn of the century of the
statutory provisions upon which the
Court relies. These current and now
longstanding federal policies weigh
decisively against the Court’s finding
that Congress has intended the States
to tax—and, as in these cases, to
foreclose
upon—Indian-held
lands.137
Justice Blackmun went to the heart of the matter—the General
Allotment Act was enacted more than 100 years before the Court
heard Yakima and, since then, Congress and the goals that it had in
passing statutes that regulate Indian affairs had changed. At the
turn of the nineteenth century when the General Allotment Act was
enacted, Congress had the goal of assimilating Indians into the
dominant white society in order to make yeoman farmers out of as
many Indians as possible.138 These policies were a sharp contrast
136
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to the policies of the Indian Reorganization Act, which sought to
strengthen tribal governments and encourage the development of
tribal sovereignty.139 Justice Blackmun’s dissent acknowledges this
total shift in Indian policy, as well as, the failure of the Allotment
Act.140 To Justice Blackmun, the intent that Congress had in
passing the Indian Reorganization Act was, at least in part, to end
the harm done to Indian tribes by the Allotment Act.141 Given that
Congress has a plenary power when it comes to enacting statutes
that regulate Indian affairs, the congressional intent behind the
passage of the statute, or subsequent statutes that alter the policy
created by a preceding statute, should be given great weight by the
Court. Justice Blackmun gives great weight to Congressional intent
in his dissent, while Justice Scalia does not and, in doing so,
Justice Scalia gives short shrift to the trust relationship between
Congress and Indian tribes.
C.

South Dakota v. Bourland

South Dakota v. Bourland was a 1993 case dealing with treaty
and statutory interpretation centered on the Cheyenne River Act.142
Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion of the Court. The
question before the Court was whether the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe had the power to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians
on its former reservation lands that had been acquired by the
United States for the operation of the Oahe dam and reservoir.143
The Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 set aside the Great Sioux
Reservation for several Sioux tribes, including the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe.144 The Fort Laramie Treaty provided for the “absolute
and undisturbed use and occupation of Sioux Tribes and that no
non-Indians (except authorized government agents) would ever be
permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the Great Sioux
Reservation.”145 The Great Sioux Reservation was then divided
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/nrcs141p2_024362.pdf
.
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25 U.S.C. §§ 461-494 (2012).
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into several reservations by the Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25
U.S.C. §888, which demarcated the Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation, located in South Dakota.146 The 1889 statute
contained language that explicitly preserved those rights of the
Tribe held under the Fort Laramie Treaty as long as those rights
did not conflict with the language of the newly passed statute.147
In the time period following the construction of the Lake Oahe
dam, the Tribe and the State of South Dakota both regulated
hunting and fishing in the fee land surrounding the dam and
reservoir.148 In 1988, the Tribe announced that it would not
recognize hunting licenses issued by South Dakota, and that those
found within the boundaries of the reservation with only a state
hunting license would be subject to prosecution in Tribal court.149
The State filed suit seeking to enjoin the Tribe from taking action
against those hunting on non-trust lands within the boundary of the
reservation.150 The case turned on the interpretation of §10 of the
Cheyenne River Act.
The Court ruled that Congress had abrogated the Tribe’s rights
to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians in the fee lands of
the reservation that had been taken for the construction of the Lake
Oahe dam.151The Court relied upon the plain text of the Cheyenne
River Act as well as precedent from earlier decisions of the Court
to reach the conclusion that Congress had abrogated the Tribe’s
right to exclude non-Indians. Although the Court acknowledges
that statutes should be construed liberally in the favor of Indians, it
found that the language of both the Flood Control Act and the
Cheyenne River Acts eliminated the Tribe’s power to exclude nonIndians from the fee lands within the boundaries of the
reservation.152 §4 of the Flood Control Act provides that projects
such as the Oahe reservoir should be open to public use for
recreational purposes.153 Though no language in the Flood Control
Act specifically acknowledged the Tribe or the Treaty of Fort
Laramie, the Court chose to give more force to the language in the
146
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statute promising recreational use of the reservoir and the lands
adjacent to it than to the trust relationship and moral obligation to
the Tribe that was created by Congress ratifying the Treaty of Fort
Laramie.154 The Court went on to point out that if Congress
intended for the Tribe to be able to regulate hunting and fishing on
the fee lands within the boundary of the reservation, it would have
done so when it passed the Cheyenne River Act.155
Justice Blackmun’s dissent found the majority’s opinion and its
reliance on the text of the Flood Control Act and the Cheyenne
River Act to be misplaced.156 Justice Blackmun noted that the
majority found no explicit language granting the Tribe the
authority to regulate hunting and fishing on the fee lands, and also
found no language banning the Tribe from doing so. Rather,
Justice Blackmun’s dissent points out what the majority has done
in looking at the text of both statutes—using the text of the two
statutes to find an implied repeal of the Tribe’s right to regulate
hunting and fishing on the fee lands. Justice Blackmun’s dissent
advocated for the use of the Indian law canons of construction to
affirm the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
had held for the Tribe.
The majority’s reliance on the ambiguities in the text of both
the Cheyenne River Act and the Flood Control Act ignores both
the Indian law canons of construction and the trust relationship.
Ambiguities in statutes like the Cheyenne River Act and the Flood
Control Act, that Congress passes that regulate Indian affairs are
supposed to be construed liberally in the favor of Indian tribes.
Interpreting both of these statutes in such a manner would have
upheld the Tribe’s authority to regulate hunting on the fee lands of
the reservation. This would have enabled the Tribe to better ensure
a food supply for its membership. The hunting rights of the Tribe
were critically important to the Tribe and were promised to the
Tribe in perpetuity in the Treaty of Fort Laramie. Thus, the
majority’s judicial dilution of the Tribe’s ability to regulate
hunting and fishing on their treaty lands ignores the moral
obligation and trust relationship that was created between the Tribe
and Congress by the Treaty of Fort Laramie. Had the Court used
the approach of using the Indian law canons of construction to
154
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construe the ambiguities in the Flood Control Act and the
Cheyenne River Act in favor of the Tribe, he would have been able
to craft an opinion that would have been in harmony with the trust
relationship.
D.

Chickasaw Nation v. United States

In 2001 in Chickasaw Nation v. United States, the Court used
textualism in its statutory interpretation of the Indian Gaming and
Regulatory Act (IGRA) to find that Tribes are required to pay
federal taxes on pull tabs157 used in gaming.158 The Chickasaw
Nation sued the United States seeking a refund of the federal
wagering and occupational excise taxes that it had paid in
conjunction with the Nation’s pull tab gaming operations.159
Writing for the majority, Justice Steven Breyer stated that specific
canons of statutory interpretation like Indian law canons of
construction can be countered by “some maxim pointing in a
different direction.”160 Breyer went on to give more force to the
maxim that “warns us against interpreting federal statutes as
providing tax exemptions unless those exemptions are clearly
expressed.”161 The tax exemption that the Tribe sought to reclaim
the taxes that it had paid on its pull tab gaming operations, was not
expressly found in IGRA. Since the tax exemption that the Tribe
hoped for was not explicitly found in the plain text of the statute,
the Court did not find for the Tribe.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor dissented in Chickasaw. Justice
O’Connor believed that, on its face, IGRA was ambiguous as to
whether or not tribes had to pay taxes on pull tabs and so she
wrote, “Because I believe §2719(d) is subject to more than one
interpretation, and because statutes are to be construed liberally in
favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their
benefit, I respectfully dissent.”162 Justice O’Connor concludes in
her dissent that an ambiguity does exist in §2719(d) that cannot be
157
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solved by looking at either the legislative history or the text of the
statute.163 Here then, Justice O’Connor argued that the Indian law
canons of construction should be consulted by the Court.164
Further, Justice O’Connor’s approach to interpreting §2719(d)
is in harmony with the trust relationship. Justice O’Connor
acknowledged the Indian law canons of construction and applied
them to her interpretation of the statute. Justice O’Connor
acknowledged that there are two competing canons at play in this
case—the Indian law canons of construction and the canon that
Justice Breyer uses that states that tax exemptions must be
expressly given by Congress before the Court can grant them.165
Justice O’Connor points out that the Court should give more
weight to the Indian law canons of construction because the Court
has held previously, in Choate v. Trapp, that when two canons
conflict, the Indian law canon “predominates”.166 Justice
O’Connor’s dissent uses the Indian law canons of construction as
well as stare decisis in regards to Choate to reach a decision that is
in harmony with the trust relationship and acknowledges the moral
obligation that the United States owes to the Chickasaw Tribe.
E.

Carcieri v. Salazar

In 2009, in Carcieri v. Salazar, the Court used textualism to
interpret the Indian Reorganization Act instead of applying the
Indian law canons of construction.167 The issue in Carcieri was the
ability of the Department of the Interior (DOI) to take a parcel of
land into trust for the Narragansett Tribe.168 The federal
government formally recognized the Narragansett Tribe in 1983.169
After being recognized, the Tribe purchased thirty-one acres for
housing and requested that the DOI take the land into trust for the
Tribe.170 The DOI accepted the land into trust. The State of Rhode
Island and the local municipality sued to enjoin the Department’s
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action.171 The First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the DOI’s
action in Carcieri v. Kempthorne.
The Court of Appeals found that the use of the word “now” in
the statute was ambiguous.172 As evidence for this ambiguity, the
Court of Appeals cited two reasons—one, that Congress had used
the word “now” in other statutes to refer to the time of the statute’s
application and not its enactment; and, two, that the text of §479
did not clarify the meaning of “now” within the context of the
statute.173 The Court then applied the rule from Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and deferred to the
DOI’s understanding of the word “now” and ruled for the DOI and
the Tribe.”174 The State of Rhode Island then petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari.175
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion in Carcieri v.
Salazar. The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court wrote that the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” in
the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §479176 unambiguously
referred only to those tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934.
Since the Narragansett Tribe was not, then the DOI could not
legally take land into trust for the Tribe.177
The Court purported to look at the plain meaning of the words
of §479. The Court interpreted “now” as meaning at the time of the
statute’s enactment.178 Instead of interpreting “now” as the as such,
the Court should have used the Indian law canons of construction
that statutes are to be liberally construed in the favor of Indians.
The Court could have read “now” as referring to 1998, when the
DOI accepted the land into trust instead of 1934, when the statute
was enacted. Instead of doing so, the Court applied the plain
meaning rule against the DOI and the Tribe.
In writing its opinion, the Court included text from a letter
from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier.
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Section
19
of
the
Indian
Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934
(48 Stat. L., 988) provides, in effect,
that the term ‘Indian’ as used therein
shall include—(1) all persons of
Indian descent who are members of
any recognized Tribe that was under
Federal jurisdiction at the date of the
Act.
There are problems with including the text of the letter from
Collier as justification to define “now” as meaning those tribes that
were recognized by the federal government at the time of the
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act. As Justice Stevens
points out in his dissent, there were tribes that were under federal
jurisdiction at the time of the statutes enactment though the DOI
did not know it at the time and thus, they were not formally
recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.179 Three examples of
tribes that were under federal jurisdiction in 1934, but who weren’t
officially recognized by the federal government that Justice
Stevens cites are the Shoshone Indians of Nevada, the Mole Lake
Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, and the St. Croix Chippewa
Indians of Wisconsin.180 Justice Stevens also falls back on the
Indian law canons of construction to point out the error in Justice
Thomas’ construction of the word “now,” which “the Court
ignores the principle deeply rooted in [our] Indian jurisprudence
that statutes are to be construed liberally in the favor of the
Indians.”181
Carcieri has reverberated across Indian Country. Numerous
tribes have faced challenges in putting their lands into trust. The
Tribe’s opponents have typically cited Justice Thomas’ plain
meaning interpretation of §479 to successfully defeat the Tribe’s
efforts. For example, in Littlefield v. United States Department of
the Interior, the Court read §479 the same way as the Court did
and ruled against the DOI and the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe.182
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The Court’s opinion in Carcieri, and its use of an ordinary
dictionary to define the words in a statute while engaging in
statutory interpretation, ignores the trust relationship and the moral
obligation that the United States has to the Tribe. It tilts a portion
of the Indian Reorganization Act against any tribe formally
recognized by the United States after 1934. As discussed in the
portion of the note that dealt with Yakima, the Indian
Reorganization Act was passed to help tribes, not to stymie them.
The Court’s construction ignores the Congressional intent in the
passage of the Act in its narrow interpretation of the word “now.”
As Justice Brennan noted in Bryan, the trust relationship requires
that the Court use the Indian law canons of construction when
dealing with ambiguities in statutes that regulate Indian affairs.
The Court does not do that here and it does not consider the overall
Congressional intent of the Indian Reorganization Act either. By
ignoring Congressional intent and the Indian law canons of
construction, the Court crafts an opinion that is not in harmony
with the trust relationship between the United States and the Tribe
and any moral obligation that the United States has to the Tribe.
The land in question was to be placed in trust for the Tribe so that
it could build housing for its elderly members. The Court’s opinion
turns a blind eye to the fact that the United States may have an
obligation to the Tribe to see its lands returned to it when possible,
and to see that the Tribe is able to provide housing to its members
that need housing.
CONCLUSION
The adoption by the Court of textualism to interpret a statute
that regulates Indian affairs has rendered the Indian law canons of
construction obsolete. It does not matter if the case involves a
question of statutory or treaty interpretation, the Indian law canons
of construction have no longer been applied. The lasting impact of
this is that the trust relationship between Congress and tribes has
been altered by the Court. The paradigm has changed. Statutory
interpretation in Indian law has become a binary equation, when in
reality it should be a jigsaw puzzle with many pieces that need to
be correctly fitted together to form the entire completed puzzle.
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The completed puzzle is one that is in harmony with the trust
relationship between tribes and the United States, and that
acknowledges and seeks to fulfill the unique moral obligations that
the United States has to each of the 566 federally recognized tribes
within its borders. The previous cases show that the Court no
longer considers how the trust relationship impacts its
interpretation of a statute, nor does it consider legislative intent or
the Indian law canons of construction. Thus, Congress must be
very careful whenever it drafts legislation that regulates Indian
affairs. This language will not be examined from the context from
which it was in, nor will the intent that Congress had in passing it
be given weight. All that will matter for the foreseeable future will
be the plain black and white text of the statute that rolls out of the
Government Printing Office. Perhaps with the February 2016
passing of Justice Scalia, this will change and the Court will move
back to using legislative history and the Indian law canons of
construction in interpreting statutes that regulate Indian affairs,
leaving Justice Scalia to fistfight in heaven with Tonto over the
meaning of a word in a statute passed a long time ago.

